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R
ecently, there has been a growing interest in developing and applying knowledge-
based technologies to aid hazard identi® cation methods such as Hazop (Hazard and
Operability Studies), fault tree analysis and check-lists which have traditionally been
carried out manually. A critical factor is the knowledgewhich is used. Previous experience and
cases of failure provide an important source of information which can be used to update
knowledge. However, the volume of data is normally too great to carry out manual analysis.
Moreover, the data is complex in structure and of diverse types, as well as being noisy and
having missing elements. This results in the databases being mainly used for archive and
retrieval. This paper reports the application of probabilistic networks and how they can be used
for learning about failure diagnosis of process units by extracting knowledge from the
databases in the form of rules, which can be used either by experts or in building expert
systems.
Keywords: data mining; knowledge discovery in databases; failure diagnosis; probabilistic
networks.
INTRODUCTION
The increasing complexity and level of integration of
process plant units has made the assessment of potential
hazards or operability problems more important and
dif® cult. Hazard assessment and failure diagnosis in process
plants identi® es what can go wrong and analyses the
consequences in order to eliminate potential hazards either
by changing process design or the safeguards and controls1 .
Technologies for assessing hazards or operability problems
have traditionally been manual, most notably hazard and
operability studies (Hazop)2 ,3 , fault tree analysis3 and
check-lists3 . Of these, Hazop is generally recognized as
the best and is typically performed by a team of experts
examining the process P&ID section by section and unit by
unit to identify potential safety and operability problems. It
is a laborious, time-consuming and expensive activity which
can take several months on a large project with two or three
teams working in parallel on different sections of the plant.
Recently there has been a growing interest in developing
and applying knowledge-based technologies to automate
hazard identi® cation methods4±11. A critical issue in all of
these systems is how knowledge is to be collected and
updated.
It has been recognized that previous experience and cases
of failure can provide an important source of information for
updating knowledge and a number of databases have been
developed. However, such databases have been mainly used
for archiving and retrieval purposes. It is clearly desirable to
be able to extract knowledge automatically and reason with
it rather than simply rely on empirical knowledge. In
addition, systems which are able to mine previous data
successfully can provide a complementary approach to
failure diagnosis and risk assessment, as has been demon-
strated by MITI in Japan. Their study collected data on
maintenance schedules and plant failure from more than 60
companies and provided a basis for identifying incipient
failures. In this paper, we report the application of
probabilistic networks and learning approaches to failure
diagnosis of process units by generating uncertainty rules
from databases. We ® rst discuss database systems compiled
from cases of failure and then introduce probabilistic
networks and a learning approach. Application of the
approach is discussed by reference to two case studies.
DATABASES OF PROCESS FAILURES
The importance of collecting safety-related data has been
widely addressed1 2 ,1 3 ,1 4 and a very large number of accident
reports now exist both in-company1 3 and worldwide1 4 .
Problems of con® dentiality are gradually being resolved and
with the widespread use of computers in decision support
systems, there is a critical need to be able to digest the
large volume of data being generated. What is important is
not the volume of information but the information content
to be retained, to move away from being data-rich and
information-poor.
Work so far has concentrated on collecting data and
archiving for subsequent retrieval1 3 ,1 4 ,1 5 . While this is
useful for reference purposesÐ for example, by using
previous cases in risk assessmentÐ there is no guarantee
that the samples are large enough, or have been collected in
an appropriate form1 6 . There is little knowledge and few
model-based methods to help make maximum use of such
information.
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Besides retrieval, the current approaches are not able to
indicate further uses of the data. This is particularly true in
respect of the problems managers face with regard to safety
and the environment. There is unquestionably a need to
establish a coherent framework for data in order for it to
provide a focus for speci® c issues such as risk assessment.
Volume is clearly an important consideration. For
example, an incident database for a medium-sized company
might include tens of thousands of abnormal occurrence
reports. If normal operational data is also includedÐ which
it should be to provide basic informationÐ then this
considerably increases the number of cases to be con-
sidered. Creating value from volume is undoubtedly an
important objective, as shown in Figure 11 7 .
PROBABILISTIC NETWORKS AND LEARNING
METHODS
Probabilistic Networks
A probabilistic network (some times called a probabilistic
graph, Bayesian network or belief network), B, over a set of
variables U, is a pair (BS , BP )
1 8 ,1 9 . BS is called the network
structure of B and takes the form of a directed acyclic graph
with one node for each variable in U. For simplicity, it is
assumed that variables in U are discrete. BP is a set of
conditional probability tables; for every variable xi [ U, BP
contains a conditional probability table, having parameters
P(xi / p i ), which enumerates probabilities for all values of xi
given all combinations of values of the variables in its
parent set p i. Figure 2 shows two belief network structures
containing three variables.
The nodes in a probabilistic network represent variables
and directed acyclic arcs between nodes representing
probabilistic dependencies. In Figure 2(a), the arc from x1
to x2 indicates that these two variables are probabilistic
dependent. The absence of an arc from x1 to x3 implies that
there is no direct probabilistic dependency between these
two variables and the probability of x3 is conditionally
independent of the value of x1 for a given value of x2 . The
conditional dependency between two directly connected
variables is described by a conditional probability, for
example P(x2 =1|x1 = 0.8). For the probabilistic network
structure Figure 2(a), suppose each variable can take one of
the two values, 0 or 1, then the conditional probability table
is as shown in Table 1.
The attraction of probabilistic networks is that they
provide a graphical modelling language for representing
uncertain relationships. For example, in failure analysis or
troubleshooting,logical analysis can be suf® cient to identify
a fault. However, in many cases the root fault cannot be
resolved by a deterministic analysis. In such cases, there is
typically a set of candidate paths to explore and a set of root
faults to consider for each path. The probabilistic networks
graphically represent the probability that each path contains
the root fault. This graphically represented knowledge can
be used to develop expert systems or used directly for fault-
® nding by experienced engineers.
Learning Probabilistic Networks
Learning probabilistic networks develops networks by
learning from databases made up of previous cases. Given a
database representing relationships of variables, such
as Table 2, the task of learning probabilistic networks is
two-foldÐ learning the network structure and compiling a
probabilistic table.
For the database shown in Table 2, it is not possible to
know the most probable dependencies directly. Figures 2(a)
and (b) illustrate two such dependencies. The ® rst step in
learning a probabilistic network is to ® nd the most probable
network structure or select from a number of structures.
Theoretically, for a given database there is a unique
structure which has a joint probability2 0 which can be
found by any one of a number of algorithms2 1 ,2 2 . Sometimes
a structure can also be found by applying domain knowl-
edge. When a structure is identi® ed, the second step is to
® nd the probabilistic table.
CASE STUDY 1: LEARNING FROM A DATABASE
OF COMPRESSOR FAILURES
Compressors are widely used in the chemical industry,
most of which are reciprocating (Figure 3). According to a
survey of the nitrogen fertilizer industry in China in 1989,
there were 1227 reciprocating compressors in use2 3 and they
account for a high proportion of all equipment failures. The
survey showed that nearly 50% of reported equipment
failures are due to compressors2 3 . This study uses 356 of the
reported failures2 3 . Those are summarized in Table 3, where
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Figure 1. From volume to value.
Figure 2. An example of two probabilistic networks.
Table 1. The probability table associated with the probabilistic network
structure (Figure 2(a)).
P(x1 =1) = 0.6 P(x1= 0) = 0.4
P(x2 =1| x1=1)= 0.8 P(x2=0 | x1=1) = 0.2
P(x2=1 | x1=0)= 0.3 P(x2=0 | x1=0) = 0.7
P(x3=1 | x2=1)= 0.9 P(x3=0 | x2=1) = 0.l
P(x3=1 | x2=0)= 0.15 P(x3=0 | x2=0) = 0.85
1 represents a fault and 0 no-fault. For clarity only a few
illustrative cases are shown, since it is neither practical nor
necessary to show all 356 cases. They indicate that a
compressor failure is caused by the failure of one of the
component parts including piston, piston rod, air-operated
valve, cylinder, cylinder cover, head, connection rod, crank
shaft, etc.. While this is not suf® ciently exhaustive for a
comprehensive diagnostic system, the purpose here is to
demonstrate the approach and so is suf® cient. The following
illustrates how to develop a probabilistic dependency table
for a de® ned network structure and to use this to study the
variable dependency relationships which help in building a
reliable network structure.
Determination of a Conditional Probability
Dependency Table
Using knowledge of compressors and an initial study of
cases of failure, the probabilistic network shown in Figure 4
is developed. This is a tree graph, where every node, except
the root, has only one input link and is a special case of a
probabilistic network2 4 .
The arc from node y1 to z1 represents the conditional
probabilistic dependency of the two nodes:
P(z1 = fault| y1 = fault)= P(z1 = 1| y1 = 1)= 0.12
which indicates the probability of z1 being a fault when y1
is a fault, while P(z1 = 0 | y1 = 1) = 0.88 gives the
probability of z1 being no-fault when y1 is a fault.
Similarly, P(x1 = 1 | z1 = 1) describes the probability of x1
being fault conditional on z1 being a fault.
The smoothing method2 5 and the method of calculating
the expectations of conditional probability2 1 can be used to
estimate the probabilistic table. In this work the latter is
used, based on the following equation:
h ijk =
Nijk + 1
Nij + ri
(1)
In equation (1), h ijk is the conditional probability
P(xi = vi k | p I =wi j), i.e. the probability that xi has a value
vi k , for some k from 1 to ri, given that the parents of xi,
represented by p i, are instantiated as wi j. ri is the number of
possible value assignments to node xi. In this case study, all
nodes take only two values, 0 or 1, therefore, ri ; 2. Ni j k in
equation (1) is the number of cases in the database in which
variable xi has the value of vi k and p i is instantiated as wi j
and:
Nij =
ri
k=1
Nijk (2)
Take P(x1 = fault | z1 = fault) =P(x1 = 1 | z1 = 1) as an
example. Since x1 is a binary variable, rx 1 =2. There are
43 cases in the database in which z1 = 1 and therefore
Nx 1 , z 1 = 43. Of these, there are ® ve cases where z1 = 1
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Table 2. A database example.
Variable values
Case x1 x2 x3
1 1 0 0
2 1 1 1
3 0 0 1
4 1 1 1
5 0 0 0
6 0 1 1
7 1 1 1
8 0 0 0
9 1 1 1
10 0 0 0
Table 3. The database for reciprocating compressor failure.
Case y1 z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8 z9 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
... ...
30 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
31 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
32 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
33 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
34 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
35 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
... ...
352 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
353 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
354 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
355 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
356 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Figure 3. Structure of a high pressure reciprocating compressor. z1Ð
piston; z2Ð piston rod; z3Ð air-operated valve; z4Ð cylinder; z5Ð
cylinder cover; z6Ð head; z7Ð connection rod; z8Ð crank shaft.
and x1= 1, so Nx 1 ,z 1 ,2 = 5. Substituting these values into
equation (1):
P(x1 = 1| z1 = 1)= h x1,z1,2 = (5 + 1)/ (43 + 2)
=0.13
The probabilities in Table 4 are typical results. Since only
two states are possible, P(z1 = 0| y1 = 1)= 1-P(z1 =
1| y1 = 1). For example, from Table 4 we know
P(z1 = 1| y1 = 1)= 0.12, then we can get
P(z1 = 0| y1 = 1)= 0.88.
The results shown in Table 4 are used to build a
knowledge base of an expert system for safety and fault
diagnosis. The propagation algorithms of probabilities
for networks have been discussed2 0 and used in the
MYCIN expert systems shell. This avoids the tedium of
manual knowledge acquisition which in any case is
not ef® cient, especially where knowledge is subject to
uncertainty.
Compared with neural networks (NNs), probabilistic
networks representation is explicit and takes a cause-effect
form. On the other hand, neural networks are able to learn
complex non-linear relationships between multiple inputs
and outputs. However, a major disadvantage is that the
knowledge embedded in a neural network is opaque2 6 ,2 7 , so
it is not possible to explain how conclusions are reached.
Although it is possible to acquire knowledge from qualita-
tive reasoning and analysis of connection weights2 8 ,2 9 ,
this suffers from being a black-box technique and has
limited ability to help improve heuristic understanding of
the domain problem.
The probabilistic network shown in Figure 4 has been
built based on knowledge of reciprocating compressors. In
many situations, the most probable cause-effect relationship
cannot be built directly using only domain knowledge. It is
necessary to combine both domain knowledge and mathe-
matical procedures. Mathematical algorithms compare
several candidate structures and search for the most
probable from all possible structures. Discussion here is
restricted to the former since the latter becomes very
complex in computation when the size of network is large,
as will be shown later. To compare candidate structures,
Cooper and Herskovits2 1 developed a Bayesian method and
Bouckaert2 2 proposed a minimum description length
principle. Cooper and Herskovits2 1 de® ned a quality
measure of a network structure BS for a given database D
as the probability of the structure P(BS , D) de® ned by:
P(BS,D)= P(BS)
n
i=1
qi
j=1
(ri - 1)!
(Nij + ri - 1)!
ri
k=1
Nijk! (3)
where P(BS ) is the probability of BS prior to observation of
the database, which is assumed equal for all network
structures. Each variable xi in BS has a set of parents
represented by a list of variables p i. Let wi j denote the jth
unique instantiation of p i relative to the database, for which
there are qi such unique instantiations of p i. The meanings
of other symbols are the same as in equation (1).
For the example represented by Figure 2 and Table 2,
equation (3) becomes:
P(BS1,D)
= P(BS1) (
2 - 1)!5!5!(2 - 1)!1!4!(2 - 1)!4!1!
(10 + 2 - 1)!(5 + 2 - 1)!(5 + 2 - 1)!
= P(BS1)(2 - 1)!0!!5!(2 - 1)!4!1!(5 + 2 - 1)!(5 + 2 - 1)!
= P(BS1)2.23 ´10-9
Figure 5 explains in more detail how the second and
third terms in the above equation are obtained. Using the
same procedure, P(BS 2 , D) =P(BS 2 ) 2.23´10-10. Assuming
P(BS 1 ) = P(BS 2 ), then P(BS 1 , D)/P(BS 2 ,D)=10 and gives BS 1
(Figure 2(a)), the most probable network structure.
In the case of the reciprocating compressor, only the top
two layers of Figure 4 are considered, i.e. variables y1 ,
z1 , z9 . The objective is to compare the two structures
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Figure 4. The probabilistic network for the reciprocating compressor.
Table 4. The probabilistic table trained with the data from
Table 3.
P(z1=1 | y1=1)= 0.12 P(x1=1 | z1=1) = 0.13
P(z2=1 | y1=1)= 0.25 P(x2=1 | z1=1) = 0.53
P(z3=1 | y1=1)= 0.05 P(x3=1 | z1=1) = 0.13
P(z4=1 | y1=1)= 0.23 P(x4=1 | z1=1) = 0.04
P(z5=1 | y1=1)= 0.10 P(x5=1 | z1=1) = 0.18
P(z6=1 | y1=1)= 0.07 P(x6=1 | z1=1) = 0.07
P(z7=1 | y1=1)= 0.03 ... ...
P(z8=1 | y1=1)= 0.09 P(x1=1 | z4=1) = 0.64
P(z9=1 | y1=1)= 0.07 P(x2=1 | z4=1) = 0.13
... ... P(x3=1 | z4=1) = 0.04
P(x4=1 | z4=1) = 0.07
P(x5=1 | z4=1) = 0.13
P(x6=1 | z4=1) = 0.04
... ...
Figure 5. Calculation of Nijk for nodes from x1 to x2.
shown in Figures 6(a) and (b). Using equation (3) and data
on all 356 cases from Table 3 to ® nd the probabilities of
structure Figure 6(a) and (b), the ratio of P(BS , D) for
Figure 6(a) is given by :
=
1!313!43!
357!
1!321!35!
357!
278!35!
314!
43!
44!
240!35!
276!
81!
82!
= 313!321!314!276!44!82!357!357!278!240!35!
Clearly, when the number of cases in the database is
large, the combinational problem makes this approach
impracticable. In the case of Figure 6(a) and (b), only two
arcs are different. If there are other different node
connections, the number of cases becomes large. Generally,
for realistically sized databases, searching for the most
probable structure by exhausting all possible structures
using the approach of Cooper and Herskovits21 is not
feasible.
Mathematical methods are nevertheless important when
the network structure cannot be completely built solely
based on domain knowledge, especially for large databases
and where manual analysis is impractical. A practical
approach is to combine domain knowledge and mathema-
tical approaches. The following section illustrates this
approach by reference to a case study.
CASE STUDY 2: SEMI-AUTOMATIC
CONSTRUCTION OF DECISION TREES
In case study 1, the decision tree developed based on
domain knowledge and automatic construction of decision
trees using the Cooper and Herskovits2 1 method was shown
to be impractical where more than several hundred cases
need to be considered. In this section a case study
employing semi-automatic construction of a decision tree
in conjunctionwith a different learningmethod is examined.
It is not possible to use the compressor since the data
patterns are not large enough to construct a tree auto-
matically. So a case study based on a ¯ uid catalytic cracking
(FCC) process described by Venkatasubramanian and
Chan3 0 is adopted. However the data set has been expanded
to include more patterns. The problem is de® ned by
reference to Figure 7(i) and Table 5. Assume that x1±x13
affect A, B, C and D, i.e., x1±x13 in¯ uence the FCC
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Figure 6. Two network structures to be compared for the reciprocating
compressor case study. All symbols have the same meaning as in Figure 3.
Figure 7. Decision tree construction through learning 864 data patterns in Table 6. (i) Numerous possible linkages between upper and lower layer nodes. (ii)
The decision tree learned which is a graphical equivalent of the rules in Table 7.
Table 5. The nodes of the two adjacent layers in a decision tree for trouble-
shooting a FCC process.
Nodes at the upper layer
A - High catalyst losses in reactor
B - High catalyst losses in regenerator
C - Yield losses
D - Normal operation
Nodes at the lower layer
x1 - Hole in reactor plenum
x2 - Dipleg damage
x3 - Reactor cyclone damage
x4 - Damage to regenerator grid
x5 - Plugged dipleg or jammed trickle valve
x6 - Regenerator partial bed de¯ uidisation
x7 - High regenerator velocity
x8 - Catalyst attrition
x9 - Vanadium poisoning of catalyst
x10 - Sodium poisoning of catalyst
x11 - Nickel poisoning of catalyst
x12 - Hydro-thermal deactivation
x13 - Thermal deactivation
operation so that the operation can be in various states
including high catalyst losses in reactor (A), high catalyst
losses in regenerator (B) or yield losses (C). The goal is to
construct a decision tree with A, B, C and D in the upper
layer while x1±x13 are in the lower layer. Clearly there are
numerous alternative possibilities. From a large number of
data patterns for how x1±x13 affect A, B, C and D, data
mining technology can be used to generate a decision tree
structure automatically. However this is a semi-automatic
approach since the nodes in the upper and lower layers have
been determined from domain knowledge.
An expandeddatabase of 864 patterns is shown in Table 6,
where there are some repeat patterns and noisy data. The
learning approach was initially proposed by Quinlan3 1 and
was later improved and made available as a commercial
software package named C5.03 2 ,3 3 . C5.0 is a system that can
learn to predict a case class from its attribute values. The
detailed algorithm can be found3 1 ,3 2 so is not given here but
the sort of task for which C5.0 is designed can be seen
clearly from the case study in this section.
The upper layer in Figure 7(i) represents four states of
FCC operation or, in other words, four classes of operation.
The lower layer nodes are attributes that can determine
classi® cation (or states) of operation. A representative set of
the 864 data patterns is shown in Table 6. It is possible to
generate a detailed tree structure using the learning
procedure and the results of this is given as either a decision
tree or extracted rules, as shown in Table 7.
Although the decision tree in Table 7 may not look like a
tree, it can be paraphrased as:
IF x2= a, THEN A
ELSE IF x2= n, THEN
IF x6 = a, THEN B
ELSE IF x6 = n THEN
IF x11= a THEN C
ELSE ... ...
Such a decision tree can sometimes be dif® cult to
understand and a much clearer form is as rules, given in
the lower part of Table 7. A numeric value is attached to
each rule, indicating the con® dence with which the
prediction is made. The rules can easily be interpreted as
a decision tree, as shown in Figure 7 (ii), which is a more
familiar form.
CONCLUSIONS
There has been a growing interest in developing and
applying knowledge-based technologies to automate hazard
identi® cation methods which have traditionally been carried
out manually. A critical issue is collecting knowledge about
the processes. Previous experience and cases of failure
provide an important source of knowledge. This information
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Table 6. Data patterns used for constructing a decision tree (for x1±x13 and A±D see Table 5. nÐ normal, aÐ abnormal).
Data x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 A/B/C/D
1 n n a n n n n n n n n n n A
2 n n n n n n n n n n a n n C
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
864 n n n n n n n n n a n n a C
Table 7. Results obtained by learning the database in Table 6 using C5.0.
Read 864 cases from fccdata011.data
Decision tree obtained:
x2= a: A
x2= n:
:...x6= a: B
x6= n:
:...x11= a: C
x11= n:
:...x1= a: A
x1= n:
:...x3= a: A
x3= n:
:...x4= a: B
x4 = n:
:...x7= a: B
x7= n:
:...x5= a: B
x5= n:
:...x8= a: B
x8= n:
:...x9= a: C
x9= n:
:...x12= a: C
x12= n:
:...x10= a: C
x10= n:
:...x13= a: C
x13= n: D
Extracted rules (Convert trees to rules):
Rule 1: x2= a -> class A [0.988]
Rule 2: x1= a -> class A [0.985]
Rule 3: x3= a -> class A [0.985]
Rule 4: x6= a -> class B [0.994]
Rule 5: x7= a -> class B [0.993]
Rule 6: x5= a -> class B [0.993]
Rule 7: x4= a -> class B [0.990]
Rule 8: x8= a -> class B [0.990]
Rule 9: x11= a -> class C [0.994]
Rule 10: x12= a -> class C [0.993]
Rule 11: x10= a -> class C [0.993]
Rule 12: x9= a -> class C [0.990]
Rule 13: x13= a -> class C [0.990]
Rule 14: x1= n x2= n x3= n
x4= n x5= n x6= n
x7= n x8= n x9= n
x11= n x12= n
-> class D [0.555]
Default class:B
Evaluation on training data (864 cases):
144 class A
320 class B
320 class C
80 class D
can be compiled into a database. However, the volume of
data is normally too large for manual analysis. This means
the information is mainly used for archiving and retrieval.
This study has shown that data mining using probabilistic
networks can extract knowledge from such data. The
networks developed for learning give considerable insight
into the cause - effect relationships embedded in the data,
which is clearly of considerable value1 3 .
While the principles of the approach have been
established, there are problems to be solved in dealing
with large databases. These problems mainly come from
data which tends to be incomplete, i.e. where the values of
some data attributes are missing. Moreover, the structure is
complex and of diverse types as well as having redundant
elements, which is further complicated by dynamic, sparse
and noisy components. Available techniques and systems so
far can only deal with some of the issues, not all. It is
important to develop systems to handle these problems
which can combine domain knowledge with case-based
reasoning and also include technologies such as normal-
ization, visualization and neural networks to address the
dif® culties in data.
NOMENCLATURE
A see Table 5
a see Table 6
B see Table 5
B Bayesian or probabilistic network
BS structure of the probabilistic network B
BP conditional probabilistic table of the probabilistic network B
C see Table 5
D database
k the kth value assignment to node xi , k changes from 1 to ri
n see Table 6
Nijk in equation (1) is the number of cases in the database in which
variable xi has the value of vik and p i is instantiated as wij
Nij de® ned by equation (2)
P(xi/p i) probability of xi conditional to p i
P(BS) the probability of BS prior to observation of the database
qi number of unique instantiations of p i to wij
ri the number of possible value assignments to node xi
U set of variables
vik the value of xi for some k from 1 to ri
wij the jth instantiation of p i
xi a variable in U; a node variable in B
x1 , x13 as in Figure 4 or Table 5
z1 , z9 as in Figure 3
Greek letters
p i set of parent variables of xi
h ijk the conditional probability P(xi = vik | p i=wij)
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